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ANNEX 1

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WAR

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On the propaganda front, Yugoslav media persist in being the Arab world's shrillest champion in East Europe. Commentary also has focused on "the ever increasing amount of proof that the US is actively aiding Israel." Soviet aid to the Arabs has either been played down or simply ignored, [REDACTED]

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Tito also acted immediately to establish channels for military and political reporting on the war. With the outbreak of hostilities, he set up a top level "task force" composed of Bijedic, Defense Minister Ljubicic and a deputy defense minister to keep on top of the situation.

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Tito's angry preoccupation with the war probably is related to his concern over the viability of the nonaligned movement. As in 1967, he gives the impression of believing that he faces a "great power"

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[redacted]

conspiracy against the nonaligned world. The coup against Allende, which he took very personally, also contributed to this attitude. Tito is a founding father of the nonaligned movement, which he views as a restraining force on the abuse of power, particularly by the USSR and the United States. He is discouraged by inertia within the movement, and may believe that his strong support of the Arabs [redacted]

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[redacted] has the potential to revitalize it.

The Yugoslav leader is fully aware, however, that his adamant stance is risky. Most Yugoslavs have neither a particular love for the Arabs nor a special dislike for the Israelis. Above all, they want to avoid direct involvement in a Middle East crisis. Tito's hurried trip to Moscow to sign a declaration condemning Israel in the wake of the 1967 war was not popular with the populace, who viewed it as sacrificing some of Yugoslavia's hard-won independence. The trip also raised doubts in the West about how nonaligned he really was.

Tito also knows that his current attitude will inevitably cause tensions in Yugoslav-US relations. In weighing his commitment to nonalignment against relations with Washington, however, he apparently is confident that differences with the US can be solved after the crisis. On 18 October, for example, a Foreign Ministry spokesman asserted that "disagreement on some issues should not deter continued development of bilateral relations."

At the same time, Tito almost certainly does not want a protracted war. He has long desired to extend Belgrade's influence in the Mediterranean. From his point of view, peace can only be established if the region is free from "super-power" competition and if the Arabs regain territories lost in 1967. A long war,

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however, could increase the rivalry between Moscow and Washington. Tito would be concerned that this possibility would subject Belgrade to Soviet pressure for "rights" that, if granted, would compromise Yugoslav independence.

Tito's extremist stance thus presents him with a dilemma. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that "As long as Arab countries are exposed to aggression, Yugoslavia will, within its capabilities, provide moral, political, and materiel support and aid, including the facilities which the Arab countries request from us regarding the use of our air space for the transportation of the aid they need."

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